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The net benefits of compliance with sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX or the Act) have been a point of contention since its enactment.  Emerging research 
suggests a spillover effect from internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) to operations 
(Bauer, 2016; Bauer et al., 2018; Caplan et al., 2017; M. Cheng et al., 2013; Q. Cheng et al., 
2018; Feng et al., 2015; Su et al., 2014).  This study seeks to extend this line of research by 
investigating the benefits of effective ICFR for customer satisfaction.  Satisfying customers is a 
primary operating objective of most companies (Malhotra & Malhotra, 2011) because high 
customer satisfaction leads to less customer turnover, lower price elasticity of demand, lower 
customer acquisition costs, and improved company reputation, improved firm performance, and 
higher returns for shareholders (Anderson et al., 1994, 2004; Chandrashekaran et al., 2007; 
Fornell, 1992; Fornell et al., 2006, 2016; Grewal et al., 2010; Hult et al., 2017; Reichheld & 
Sasser Jr., 1990).  Therefore, knowledge of the impact of ICFR on customer satisfaction has 
value to managers, regulators, and academics. This study estimates the treatment effect of 
remediating a control deficiency on customer satisfaction using a fixed-effects regression and a 
dynamic difference-in-difference model (de Chaisemartin & D’Haultfœuille, 2018). No 
statistically significant treatment effect is identified, although point estimates suggest a negative 





Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act or SOX) require 
companies to design and implement an effective system of internal controls over financial 
reporting (ICFR) and disclose whether the system of ICFR is effective or ineffective.  In 
addition, SOX § 404 requires the company’s auditor to issue an opinion on the effectiveness of 
the company’s ICFR.  Proponents of the Act believe that SOX § 302 and § 404 compliance led 
to the identification of weaknesses and gaps which resulted in improved disclosure, transparency, 
and corporate governance (Wagner & Dittmar, 2006), while opponents argue that compliance 
with SOX costs more than the benefits (Hochberg & Sapienza, 2009).  The predominant view of 
managers seems to be that the costs of complying with SOX outweigh the benefits (Wade, 2008), 
and only 29% of managers surveyed by Alexander et al. (2013) believe that there are operational 
or compliance benefits to effective ICFR.  This study seeks to provide additional evidence for the 
discussion of the benefits of ICFR requirements of SOX § 404 by examining the effect of ICFR 
on customer satisfaction, which is a measure of a firm’s operating results.   
Satisfying customers is a primary operating objective of most companies (Malhotra & 
Malhotra, 2011) because high customer satisfaction leads to less customer turnover, lower price 
elasticity of demand, lower customer acquisition costs, and improved company reputation, 
improved firm performance, and higher returns for shareholders (Anderson et al., 1994, 2004; 
Chandrashekaran et al., 2007; Fornell, 1992; Fornell et al., 2006, 2016; Grewal et al., 2010; Hult 
et al., 2017; Reichheld & Sasser Jr., 1990).  Therefore, knowledge of the impact of ICFR on 
customer satisfaction has value to managers, regulators, and academics.   
Academics and practitioners accept that an effective internal control system will help a 
company achieve its objectives in three areas: operations, compliance, and financial reporting 




example, a firm’s control environment supports all three objectives, and some business process 
controls address more than one objective.  Following the enactment of SOX, research on ICFR 
focused on its impact on financial reporting quality, largely ignoring the possibility that ICFR 
might have a spill-over effect on operations and compliance (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008, 2009; 
Chan et al., 2008; Doyle et al., 2007a; Ge et al., 2017; Ge & McVay, 2005; Goh, 2009); 
however, in recent years a developing stream of research provides evidence of such a spillover 
effect (Bauer, 2016; Bauer et al., 2018; Caplan et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2019; Feng et al., 2009, 
2015; Gallemore & Labro, 2015; Lawrence et al., 2018; Li et al., 2012; Su et al., 2014).  This 
line of research concludes that information from the financial reporting system is used for 
internal decisions and is used to provide information to non-investor/creditor stakeholders such 
as suppliers, customers, and employees.  Some studies conclude that the impact of ineffective 
ICFR on operations or compliance is the result of ineffective ICFR leading to lower quality 
information from the financial reporting system leading to lower quality operating or compliance 
decisions (Bauer, 2016; Caplan et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2009, 2015; Gallemore & Labro, 2015; 
Li et al., 2012).  Others conclude that ineffective ICFR results in increased information 
asymmetry, negatively impacting relationships with third parties (e.g., customers and suppliers) 
relying on information produced by the company (Bauer et al., 2018; Su et al., 2014). A third 
group did not seek to determine a causal relationship but did find a positive relationship between 
ICFR and an operating or compliance activity (Choi et al., 2019; Lawrence et al., 2018).   
These studies not only provide evidence of a spillover effect from ICFR to operations or 
compliance but also provide a plausible link from ICFR to customer satisfaction.  Based on the 
evidence that managers use information from the financial reporting system to make operating 




produced by the financial reporting system, it is logical to conclude that these operating 
decisions will impact customers satisfaction (Bauer, 2016; Caplan et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2009, 
2015; Gallemore & Labro, 2015; Li et al., 2012).  Indeed, Feng et al. (2015) found that 
ineffective ICFR leads to lower quality inventory management decisions, and poor inventory 
management decisions likely lead to lower customer satisfaction through stock-outs and 
purchase of low demand items.  Su et al. (2014) found, in a business-to-business (B2B) setting, 
sales growth decreases in the year following the disclosure of ineffective ICFR.  Presumably, 
lower sales growth reflects, among other things, lower customer satisfaction.  In addition, other 
studies by Feng et al. (2009) and Li et al. (2012) found that ineffective ICFR leads to less precise 
forecasts and guidance, which likely reflects deficiencies in managements’ ability to predict 
what, why, how, when, and where customers will want to make purchases. The failure to make 
these predictions accurately can lead to dissatisfied customers.   
This study adds to the literature examining the spillover effects of ICFR on operations by 
evaluating the impact of ICFR on customer satisfaction. While prior research shows that a 
control deficiency in ICFR can lead to the loss of valuable customers in the context of B2B sales 
(Bauer et al. 2018), it is not clear whether prior research generalizes to the context of B2C sales. 
The ACSI measure allows me to test for this non-trivial generalization of prior results and 
broaden our understanding of the spillover effect of ICFR into operations.  Issued by ACSI, 
LLC, the ACSI score measures the quality of products and services offered in U. S. markets.  
The ACSI score is issued for approximately 300 of the largest U.S. companies in the consumer 
market across 45 industries, and the score is constructed by surveying approximately 17,500 U.S. 




A result indicating that companies with effective ICFR have higher customer satisfaction 
ratings would weaken the case that SOX was a costly political overreaction to a few high-profile 
failures of companies such as Enron and WorldCom because at least some of the cost of 
implementing effective ICFR would be offset by operational benefits that ultimately impact a 
firm’s customers. Regulators and managers should consider these indirect benefits in their cost-
benefit calculation concerning the efficiency of SOX.  This study does not seek to evaluate all 
costs and benefits of SOX compliance; instead, it seeks to introduce additional considerations by 
investigating the benefits of effective ICFR for customer satisfaction.  This study seeks to extend 
this line of research by providing evidence that ICFR affects a firm’s relationship with its 
customers in a B2C setting.  Evidence of a relationship between ICFR and customer satisfaction 
would provide further evidence that effective ICFR has benefits beyond financial reporting, 
which is something that should be considered when assessing the benefit of compliance with 
SOX sections 302 and 404.  Therefore, the results of this study potentially have implications for 
managers, auditors, and management advisors by providing evidence that ICFR also affects 
customer relationships. Managers’ decisions about the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
internal control systems, as well as auditors’ evaluation of internal control systems, may need to 
be reexamined. Regulators will also be interested in a better understanding of the broader costs 
and benefits of SOX. 
To identify the hypothesized effect of ICFR weaknesses on customer satisfaction, I rely 
on firms that discover and remediate ICFR weaknesses. My key assumption is that internal 
control weaknesses exist prior to their discovery, such that discovering and remediating internal 
controls can lead to a sustained impact on customer satisfaction. My research design corresponds 




deficiencies at different times throughout the sample period (de Chaisemartin & D’Haultfœuille, 
2018). This design allows me to identify and estimate the treatment effects that I hypothesize.  
I use two different methods to estimate the average treatment effect of remediating ICFR 
weaknesses. First, I use a fixed effects regression with firm and year fixed effects along with an 
indicator variable that captures firm-years that have remediated ICFR relative to earlier periods  
(i.e., an indicator set to one for all periods following the disclosure of an ICFR weakness that do 
not themselves have disclosed ICFR weaknesses). Recent research suggests that estimating 
treatment effects using this approach may be inappropriate in the presence of heterogeneity in 
effect sizes across treated firms and across time (see, for example, Goodman-Bacon (2018) or de 
Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2018)). To address this concern, I also estimate the 
hypothesized average treatment effect using a dynamic difference-in-difference model. Perhaps 
the most critical assumption made by this model is that treated and untreated firms have 
“common trends” in the dependent variable. Before presenting the results, I test the common 
trends assumption using the placebo effect estimation procedures in de Chaisemartin and 
D’Haultfœuille (2018).  
The results of my study do not support my hypothesis: I do not find that remediation of 
an ICFR weakness leads to an increase in customer satisfaction. In fact, all point estimates of the 
average treatment effect are negative, although they do not reach significance at traditional levels 
(all p-values>0.10). While one must be cautious while interpreting insignificant coefficients, I 
provide in the penultimate section a discussion of the reasons why remediating ICFR weaknesses 





The remaining portion of this dissertation is organized as follows. I begin by discussing 
the background of customer satisfaction, internal controls, and the costs and benefits of SOX.  I 
then move to a discussion of the development of my hypothesis and research methods.  Finally, I 
discuss the results of my analysis. All figures, tables, and references are included at the end of 
the paper, along with an appendix that provides variable definitions. 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Customer Satisfaction 
Customer satisfaction has been studied extensively in the marketing literature. The 
evidence suggests that high customer satisfaction leads to less customer turnover, lower price 
elasticity of demand, lower customer acquisition costs, and improved company reputation, 
improved firm performance, and higher returns for shareholders (Anderson et al., 1994, 2004; 
Chandrashekaran et al., 2007; Fornell, 1992; Fornell et al., 2006, 2016; Grewal et al., 2010; Hult 
et al., 2017; Reichheld & Sasser Jr., 1990).  According to empirical research, customer 
satisfaction has three antecedents (Anderson & Fornell, 2000): 
1. the customers’ perceived quality of the company’s product or service,    
2. the customers’ perceived value of the company’s product or service, and  
3. the customers’ expectations of the company’s product or service  
These inputs combine to produce customer satisfaction.  Perceived value is derived from 
perceived quality compared to price.  Perceived quality is a function of experience with the 
product or service, price, and expectations.  Previous experiences establish expectations about 
the company’s product or service, competitors’ product or service, and the anticipated benefits of 
product or service (Anderson et al., 1994; Zeithaml, 1988).  Ultimately, customer satisfaction is 
seen as a holistic evaluation of the purchase and consumption experience over time (Anderson et 




system, likely affect some of the determinants of customer satisfaction, such as price, product or 
service availability, and forecasting of sales and purchases.   
History of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting  
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires companies to disclose material 
weaknesses in ICFR.1  These requirements are the result of congress enacting a series of laws in 
response to corporate governance failures requiring companies design, implement, and maintain 
effective ICFR.  Beginning with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977, Congress 
has slowly increased companies’ ICFR requirements, and as a result, the cost of compliance has 
increased as well. Before 1977, there were no regulatory requirements that companies design or 
implement an effective system of ICFR.  Furthermore, auditing standards only required auditors 
to understand (not evaluate) a client’s system of ICFR to determine if the client’s financial 
reporting system was capable of producing reliable financial statements.  If the auditor did not 
evaluate the system of ICFR or if the auditor evaluated the system of ICFR and concluded that it 
was ineffective, the standards required the auditor to reduce reliance on the system of ICFR and 
increase substantive procedures to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level.  However, neither 
management nor the auditor was required to disclose deficiencies in internal control, and there 
were no civil or legal penalties to a company, its management, or its auditor if the company 
failed to design and maintain an effective system of ICFR.  The auditor was not required to issue 
an opinion on the effectiveness of ICFR, and ultimately, management determined the level of 
 
1 A material weakness in ICFR is defined as:  “…a deficiency, or a combination of 
deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable 
possibility that a material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements 





internal controls to be implemented (Simunic, 1984).  I present a brief history of internal control 
regulation in the United States in the following paragraphs.   
Congress enacted the FCPA in the wake of the Watergate political scandal and the 
discovery that hundreds of US companies had paid bribes to foreign officials and falsified their 
corporate records to conceal the payments (A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 2012).  The FCPA established the first legal requirement that a company devise 
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls and established civil and legal penalties for 
a company that failed to comply with its accounting requirements.  It did not, however, require 
companies or their auditors to identify and report deficiencies in internal control systems 
(Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)).   
Following the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, Congress enacted the FDIC 
Improvement Act of 1992 (FDICIA).  FDICIA applied to all financial institutions with deposits 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, requiring management to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the firms’ system of ICFR by comparing it to an established framework, disclose 
the framework used for the evaluation, and disclose any material weaknesses in internal control 
(MWIC) identified during the evaluation.2 
 
2 The COSO framework is the most widely used framework for assessing the 
effectiveness of internal control in the U.S. (Lawrence et al., 2018).  In 1985, several key 
stakeholders in the financial reporting process, including the American Accounting Association, 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Financial Executives International, the 
Institute of Internal Auditors, and the Institute of Management Accountants formed the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) to sponsor the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the Treadway Commission).  COSO published its initial internal 
control framework in 1992 and updated the framework in 2013.  According to the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a company’s ICFR is effective if no material 
weaknesses exist (AS 2201, 2007). 
 





  SOX was the third law enacted by Congress relating to ICFR and was developed in 
response to significant corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom.  Sections 302 and 404 of 
the Act are two of its most contentious provisions because they require management to assess the 
effectiveness of the firm’s ICFR and the auditor to express an opinion on management’s 
assessment (Alexander et al., 2013; Ge et al., 2017).   Section 302 requires, among other things, 
that management disclose in a company’s quarterly and annual report an acknowledgment that 
they are responsible for ICFR and their conclusions about the effectiveness of the company’s 
ICFR (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(4)).  SOX Section 404 requires that each annual 
report explicitly state that management is responsible for ICFR and contain an assessment as of 
the end of the most recent fiscal year of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and 
procedures (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a)).  Therefore, SOX provides the first legal 
requirement that companies publicly disclose MWIC and that an independent auditor attest to 
management’s assessment of ICFR.  Table 1 presents a summary of the internal control 
requirements of the three laws discussed above. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Following the enactment of SOX, practitioners, and academics primarily focused on 
internal controls over financial reporting (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008, 2009; Chan et al., 2008; 
Doyle et al., 2007a; Ge et al., 2017; Ge & McVay, 2005; Goh, 2009; Lawrence et al., 2018). 
However, recent studies have started to examine the spillover effects of ICFR into operations and 





Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting and Operations 
After SOX was implemented, the discussion of its merits largely ignored the broader 
COSO definition of internal controls, which encompasses most of management’s functions, 
including the efficiency and effectiveness of operations and compliance with laws and 
regulations (see Figure 1) (Kinney, 2000).   
[Insert Figure 1] 
COSO defines internal control as “…a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, 
management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting, and compliance” (Landsittel & 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. COSO, 2013).  COSO’s 
framework includes three objectives (operations, reporting, and compliance) and six components 
(environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring).  The objectives and components relate to all levels of the organization. 
COSO’s broad definition of internal controls suggests that an effective system of ICFR 
may have a positive effect on the objectives related to additional stakeholders such as customers, 
vendors, and employees (Akisik & Gal, 2017).  According to Lawrence et al. (2018), there are 
two reasons to expect a positive relation between ICFR and internal controls over operations, and 
compliance: (1) a control-overlap exists between financial reporting, operations, and compliance; 
(2) the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting may reflect 
management’s commitment to the control environment, which is presumed to impact internal 
controls overall.   
Beyond COSO’s broad definition of internal controls suggesting that an effective internal 




information for management decisions which leads to better decisions and better operating 
results (Feng et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012).  While prior research provides evidence that weak 
operating results are a determinant of ineffective ICFR (Doyle et al., 2007a), it is also possible 
that weak operating results are an outcome of ineffective ICFR (Feng et al., 2015).   
A contemporaneous stream of research has begun to provide evidence of the spillover 
effect of ICFR into operations and compliance.  Researchers have examined the relationship of 
ICFR and management guidance and forecasts (Feng et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012), sales growth 
(Su et al., 2014), inventory management (Feng et al., 2015), tax avoidance (Bauer, 2016; 
Gallemore & Labro, 2015), merger and acquisition decision quality (Caplan et al., 2017), data 
breaches (Lawrence et al., 2018), duration of customer-supplier relationships (Bauer et al., 
2018), and securities regulation violations (Choi et al., 2019).  A recent example of ineffective 
ICFR that affects customers is the material weakness disclosed by Marriott in their 2018 annual 
report:  
“The combination of the Starwood Preferred Guest and Marriott Rewards programs in 
August 2018 resulted in delayed, incomplete, and inaccurate reporting of Loyalty 
Program data such that the financial results of the Loyalty Program could not be properly 
recorded on a timely basis (Marriott, 2019).”   
Management Guidance and Forecasts.  Feng et al. (2009) were among the first 
researchers to examine the relationship between the quality of a company’s ICFR and operations 
by examining the relationship between internal control quality and the precision of management 
guidance.  They found that the precision of management guidance was better for companies with 
effective ICFR than for companies with ineffective ICFR.  Based on these findings, they 
concluded that ICFR quality has broader implications than just financial reporting.  Typically, 
management uses unaudited in-house management reports to produce forecasts and guidance, 




impact stakeholders such as employees, customers, and vendors (Feng et al., 2009).  A later 
study by Li et al. (2012) also found a significant relationship between ineffective internal 
controls and management forecasts, providing additional evidence of a spillover effect of ICFR 
to operations.  Both Feng et al. (2009) and Li et al. (2012) conclude that the differences in 
forecast/guidance precision are the result of lower quality information from internal reports used 
to produce forecasts and guidance.  It is reasonable to expect a company’s ability to provide 
precise forecasts to affect customer satisfaction.  Inaccurate plans and forecasts may lead to 
inventory stock-outs, over- or under-commitment of resources in service organizations, and other 
issues that may affect customer satisfaction.   
Sales Growth.  Continuing the examination of the spillover effect of ICFR into 
operations, Su et al. (2014) examined the consequences of ineffective ICFR on customers. They 
found that sales growth declines significantly following the disclosure of ineffective ICFR.  They 
deduced that disclosure of ineffective ICFR affects customers’ willingness to continue to do 
business with the company.  They further surmise that this unwillingness to continue to do 
business with a company is the result of the customers’ doubt about the company’s ability to 
follow through with its commitments to its customers, given the existence of ineffective ICFR 
(Su et al., 2014).  This assumes that customers are aware of and using company ICFR disclosures 
as they evaluate their relationship with the company.  While the study by Su et al. (2014) appears 
to be in a B2B setting, it is conceivable that lower customer satisfaction could be a factor leading 
to lower sales growth.    
Inventory Management.  Feng et al. (2015) explored the effect of ICFR on operations 




with inventory-related material weaknesses have lower-quality inventory management resulting 
in lower turnover rates and higher impairments (Feng et al., 2015).  They note,  
Many of the same policies, procedures, and controls that lead to effective ICFR related to 
inventory, however, also affect the proper accounting for inventory acquisition, sale, 
storage, and returns, leading to more effective inventory management.  Thus, we expect 
there to be mutually beneficial effects on financial reporting quality and firms’ inventory 
management as a result of having effective ICFR (Feng et al., 2015, p. 530).  
Feng et al. (2015) extended their study beyond inventory-related material weaknesses and 
identified a positive relationship between ineffective controls and ROA, providing evidence that 
designing and maintaining an effective ICFR can be financially beneficial to a company.  It is 
probable that the quality of inventory management decisions has a direct impact on customer 
satisfaction.  For example, stock-outs would seem to have a direct negative relationship with 
customer satisfaction.    
Tax Avoidance.  Both Gallemore & Labro (2015) and Bauer (2016) examined the 
relationship between ICFR and tax avoidance and found that effective ICFR results in higher 
quality internal information, which in turn leads to better decisions related to income taxes that 
ultimately lead to lower effective tax rates.   
Merger and Acquisition Decision Quality.  Caplan et al., (2017) examined the 
relationship between ICFR and the quality of merger and acquisition decision quality using SOX 
SOX §404 disclosures as a proxy for the effectiveness of ICFR and goodwill impairment as a 
proxy for the quality of merger and acquisition decisions.  Their study provides evidence that 
mergers and acquisitions that occur in years that companies disclose ineffective ICFR have a 
higher rate of goodwill impairment (Caplan et al., 2017).   In addition, they note that material 
weaknesses in ICFR have a negative correlation with managerial performance (Caplan et al., 




initially expected, possibly due to the loss of customers, i.e., ineffective ICFR leads to less 
accurate prediction of the company’s ability to meet the customers’ needs.    
Data Breaches.  Lawrence et al. (2018) examined the relationship between ICFR and 
“operational control risk indicators”,   They found that the probability of weaknesses in internal 
controls over operations is positively associated with the disclosure of ineffective ICFR 
(Lawrence et al., 2018).  While this study does not determine a causal link between data breaches 
and ICFR, it does identify a correlation between data breaches and ICFR. I expect data breaches 
will likely lead to lower customer satisfaction.   
Duration of Customer-Supplier Relationships.  Bauer et al. (2018) hypothesized and 
found a negative relationship between ICFR weaknesses and the duration of customer-supplier 
relationships in a business-to-business (B2B) setting.  Their theory was that supply chain 
partners depend on reliable systems to share information and ICFR weaknesses on the suppliers 
part signal to customers that shared information is unreliable (Bauer et al., 2018).  While Bauer 
et al. (2018) conducted their study in a B2B setting, it reasonable to expect that the duration of 
the relationships decreased as a result of lower customer satisfaction, and the ineffectiveness or 
effectiveness of ICFR may have a similar effect on consumers (either directly or indirectly 
through a deteriorated relationship with distributors). 
Securities Regulation Violations.  Choi et al. (2019) examined the relationship between 
ICFR and non-accounting SEC violations, finding a positive relationship between 
noncompliance with securities regulations and GAAP violations.  They anticipate that this 
correlation exists because of underlying company values and shared facets of the accounting and 




Summary.  The developing research stream, summarized above, provides evidence of 
the spillover effect of ICFR to operations and compliance.  Several of these articles conclude that 
the impact of ineffective ICFR on operations or compliance is the result of ineffective ICFR 
leading to lower quality information which leads to lower quality decisions (Bauer, 2016; Caplan 
et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2009, 2015; Gallemore & Labro, 2015; Li et al., 2012).  Others 
concluded that ineffective ICFR resulted in increased information asymmetry and negatively 
impacted relationships with third parties relying on information produced by the company (Bauer 
et al., 2018; Su et al., 2014), while a third group provides evidence of a relationship between 
ICFR and an operating or compliance activity (Choi et al., 2019; Lawrence et al., 2018).   
Information from the financial reporting system is often used to make pricing decisions.  Lower 
quality information may lead to mispriced products or services, given that price is an antecedent 
to customer satisfaction; it is logical to expect lower quality pricing decisions to impact customer 
satisfaction.   Companies often use information from the financial reporting system to identify 
profitable and unprofitable customers.  Reicheld (1996) presents the results of a case study 
involving a bank customer who received a letter stating that they were a preferred customer only 
to be subsequently turned down for a new credit card. The customer was unhappy and defected 
to another bank.  In this situation, the bank used inaccurate information from the financial 
reporting system (accounting system) to identify preferred customers, and the error resulted in 
customer dissatisfaction.  The financial reporting system produces billing statements, and their 
accuracy or inaccuracy of billing statements can sway customer satisfaction. 
Hallowell et al. (1996) report that improved internal service quality leads to improved 
customer satisfaction, and he identified six mechanisms necessary to improve internal service 




alignment, and training.  Many of these mechanisms are enhanced by an effective system of 
ICFR, thereby improving customer satisfaction.  For example, in regard to appropriate policies 
and procedures, the principles of the control environment suggest that those responsible for 
corporate governance should establish an appropriate structure, reporting lines, appropriate 
authority, and responsibilities (COSO, 2013).  It can be argued that teamwork will be improved 
by filling roles with trained, competent individuals aligned with company objectives.  The fourth 
COSO principle suggests that companies should commit to attracting, developing, and retaining 
competent individuals in alignment with objectives (COSO, 2013).  Other operating decisions 
such as purchase decisions, investment decisions, employment decisions, and facilities upgrades 
use information from the financial reporting system and may have an indirect impact on 
customer satisfaction.   
  The concept of high-quality information leading to customer satisfaction is supported by 
Bauer et al. (2018), who found that ineffective controls impaired suppliers’ relationships with 
customers and that disclosure of an MWIC was positively associated with the likelihood of a 
relationship being terminated in the following year.  Bauer et al. (2018) focused on large 
companies engaging in business-to-business sales, and it is not clear if their results generalize to 
consumers.   
Impacts of Ineffective Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting 
Multiple studies have found that there are negative consequences for companies that 
disclose ineffective ICFR.  Compared to firms that do not disclose ineffective ICFR, firms that 
do disclose ineffective ICFR have lower accrual quality, higher cost of equity, and higher audit 
fees (Doyle et al., 2007b; Gordon & Wilford, 2012; Hogan & Wilkins, 2008).  In addition, there 




higher for companies disclosing ineffective ICFR (Li et al., 2010).  Because of this risk to 
individuals, it is possible that SOX incentivized managers to overspend on ICFR because non-
compliance may result in a substantial personal cost to the manager.  In contrast, the cost of 
compliance is shared by all stakeholders (Coates, IV, 2007). 
Costs and Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley 
According to A.R.C. Morgan, as cited in Zhang (2007), compliance with the Act came at 
an average cost per firm ranging from $1.56 million to $10.0 million depending on a firm’s size, 
complexity, geographical dispersion, and other attributes.  Because of these financial costs as 
well as the burden of compliance, the costs and benefits of the Act have been a topic of debate 
among managers, investors, and regulators.  The predominant view among managers seems to be 
that the costs of complying with SOX outweigh the benefits (Wade, 2008).   
Researchers have attempted to evaluate the costs and benefits of SOX through event 
studies by examining abnormal stock market returns in the period leading up to the passage of 
the Act (Jain & Rezaee, 2006; Leuz, 2007; Zhang, 2007).  The results of these studies are mixed.  
Jain and Rezaee (2006) examined abnormal returns around events leading up to the passage of 
SOX. They found that “…the induced benefits of the Act significantly outweigh its imposed 
compliance costs as measured by stock prices” (Jain & Rezaee, 2006, p. 652).  While Zhang 
(2007) concluded that SOX imposed net costs on firms, she also suggested that the results from 
her event studies be interpreted with caution because all relevant factors were not captured. 
Some events unrelated to SOX but relevant to the value of the firm may have occurred at the 
same time as the passage of SOX.     
Some managers have acknowledged the value of SOX compliance requirements, “[a]s 
SOX went into effect, more and more executives began to see the need for internal reforms; 




had exposed” (Wagner & Dittmar, 2006, p. 134).  Supporters of SOX believe that the 
identification of weaknesses and gaps led to needed changes that resulted in improved disclosure, 
transparency, and corporate governance, while opponents argue that SOX has been ineffective or 
that its benefits do not outweigh the associated compliance cost (Hochberg & Sapienza, 2009). 
Consistent with the latter view, only 19% of managers surveyed by Alexander et al. (2013) 
believed that the benefits of SOX outweigh the cost, and only 29% believed that there are 
operational or compliance benefits to effective ICFR.  According to Feng et al. (2015), managers 
acknowledge that effective internal controls over financial reporting result in better quality 
information; however, they do not believe that this translates into meaningful operational 
improvements. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
While the purpose of the ACT was to enhance the quality of financial reporting to 
external users, management uses information from the financial reporting system to make many 
operating decisions.  Empirical research provides evidence that higher-quality ICFR improves 
the quality of information used to make internal decisions, resulting in better management 
decisions (Bauer, 2016; Caplan et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2009, 2015; Gallemore & Labro, 2015; 
Li et al., 2012).   Studies provide evidence that management guidance and forecasts are less 
accurate for firms with ineffective ICFR as a result of lower quality information (Feng et al., 
2009; Li et al., 2012).  As a result of lower quality information produced by a firm’s financial 
reporting system, operating decision quality is lower when ICFR is ineffective.  Researchers 
provide evidence of this by examining income tax decisions (Bauer, 2016; Gallemore & Labro, 
2015); merger and acquisition decisions (Caplan et al., 2017); and inventory management 
decisions (Feng et al., 2015).  In addition, Cheng, Goh, & Kim (2018) found that operational 




negative implications for a firm including customer dissatisfaction, implying that high-quality 
information leads to customer satisfaction.  
Based on this reasoning, I hypothesize that remediating an ICFR weakness will lead to an 
increase in customer satisfaction. Based on prior research, it is reasonable to assume that ICFR 
weaknesses exist for multiple reporting periods before they are detected. For example, Rice and 
Weber (2012) find that 67.6% of companies with restatements between October 2004 and 
November 2009 failed to identify a material weakness during the period restated, suggesting that 
material weaknesses are not identified in the period when they first occur. The existence of ICFR 
weaknesses prior to remediation allows me to identify the hypothesized treatment effects by 
examining changes in customer satisfaction that occur after an ICFR weakness is remediated. 
Formally stated, my hypothesis is: 




To test my hypothesis, I use all U.S. public firms with non-missing data for their ACSI 
score, various financial statement items used as control variables, and publicly disclosed SOX 
Section 404 opinions.  Since the first full year of material weaknesses in internal control 
disclosures under SOX were available starting in 2005, the sample stretches from 2005 to 2018, 
the last full year of material weakness disclosures available.  The sample includes accelerated 
and non-accelerated filers.     
Research Design and Identification Strategy  
I use a staggered adoption design that allows me to identify the average treatment effect 
of remediating an ICFR weakness. This design assumes that firms have a latent, unknown ICFR 




weakness to be fully remediated during the first year in which no ICFR weakness is disclosed 
after one or more years in which a weakness was disclosed. However, I also consider the first 
year prior to full remediation to have received the treatment (i.e., partial remediation occurs the 
year prior to full remediation). I have several reasons for making this design choice, the most 
important being the incentives to correct previously disclosed weaknesses. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
Once auditors or the company identify and disclose a material weakness, management 
has significant incentives to remediate the material weakness to avoid the negative consequences 
of disclosed ineffective controls.  Empirical studies provide extensive evidence that ineffective 
ICFR has negative consequences for management and the firm.  Such consequences include a 
higher cost of equity with the penalty for ICFR weaknesses increasing each year in which the 
firm fails to remediate the issue (Gordon & Wilford, 2012). Also, ICFR weaknesses result in 
higher audit fees (Hogan & Wilkins, 2008) and a higher turnover of individuals in critical 
positions (Johnstone et al., 2011). Due to the negative consequences for a company and its 
management, I expect remediation to begin immediately after discovery. However, full 
remediation is likely to take more than one reporting period, and therefore the impact on 
information quality, and consequently, improvement in customer satisfaction is likely to be 
gradual. I explicitly model this heterogeneity using a dynamic difference-in-difference model (de 
Chaisemartin & D’Haultfœuille, 2018). 
As several recent studies suggest, there are challenges with using a staggered adoption 
design (see, for example, Goodman-Bacon (2018) or de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille 
(2018)).  In particular, heterogeneity in the treatment effect across firms and time can lead to 




average treatment effect. While a fixed effects regression estimates a weighted average of the 
firm-level treatment effects, some weights can be negative. With negative weights, it is possible 
that a fixed effects regression estimates the average treatment effect to have the opposite sign of 
the true average treatment effect (de Chaisemartin & D’Haultfœuille, 2018; Goodman-Bacon, 
2018). This can happen when there is heterogeneity in the size and timing of the firm-level 
treatment effects. A priori, it seems likely that each remediation will have a unique effect size as 
each remediation addresses issues unique to the ICFR weakness that was discovered. 
Heterogenous effect sizes are especially concerning when the effect size is correlated with the 
timing of the treatment (de Chaisemartin & D’Haultfœuille, 2018). It seems plausible that the 
most significant deficiencies are either the easiest or perhaps the hardest to discover. In either 
case, the size of the treatment effect would be correlated with the timing of the treatment as the 
more significant weaknesses would either be discovered earlier or later in the sample period. 
To address these concerns, I use the methods of de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille 
(2018) to estimate the need to allow for heterogeneous effects and to provide a better estimate of 
the average treatment effect. De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2018) also provide a method 
for estimating dynamic treatment effects that vary across time, which helps alleviate concerns 
that my effect size estimates are biased downward because little remediation occurs during the 
year prior to no disclosure of an ICFR weakness. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of interest is customer satisfaction, as measured by the American 
Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI).  To develop an objective understanding of customer 
satisfaction, researchers have developed customer satisfaction indexes such as the American 




a company’s customer satisfaction performance against its prior period performance and its 
industry (Angelova & Zekiri, 2011).  According to Fornell et al. (2016), the ACSI score 
measures the quality of products and services offered in U. S. markets from a latent variable 
structural equation model (see Figure 3).  They assert that the ACSI index provides a customer 
satisfaction score for approximately 300 of the largest U.S. companies in the consumer market 
across 45 industries by surveying approximately 17,500 U.S. households each quarter resulting 
in over 3,200 firm-year observations with an average score of 76.44 and an annual standard 
deviation of 2.43.  According to Fornell et al. (2006), a 1% change in ACSI equates to 
approximately 5% change in market value.    
[Insert Figure 3] 
Proprietary software determines the weighting of questions (American Customer 
Satisfaction Index, n.d.).  The ACSI reports 90% confidence intervals of approximately +/- 0.2 
points on the national scale, and the average R2 is .75 (Anderson & Fornell, 2000).  To construct 
the measure, ACSI distributes surveys to consumers throughout the year for various companies.   
The ACSI measures are dated according to when they are issued, not when they are 
collected. Collection typically occurs several months prior to the issuance date, but the ACSI 
database does not report exact collection dates for the majority of firm-years. To ensure that the 
measurement date of the ACSI matches the timing of the identification and remediation of ICFR 
weaknesses, I subtract one year from the date reported in the ACSI database before combining 
the measure with the other databases that I use.3 
  
 
3 I repeated all analyses with alternative matching procedures and found no qualitative differences in the effect sizes 
or statistical significance of the results. For example, subtracting two years from the ACSI score’s date for firms 





Based on prior research by Ivanov et al. (2013), I have included variables to control for 
other factors that could impact customer satisfaction.  Ivanov identified research and 
development (RD) and advertising expenses (Advert) as measures of a company’s investment in 
customers and as determinants of customer satisfaction.  Both expenditures on research and 
development and advertising are viewed as prior investments in customers; by investing in 
research and development, firms provide greater product diversity and by investing in 
advertising companies increase the mean of customer utility and decrease the variance of 
customer utility (Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Erdem & Baohong Sun, 2002; Ivanov et al., 2013).  
Based on the results of their research, I included RD (research and development expenditures) 
and Advert (advertising expenditures) as control variables. 
Several other variables have been determined to be associated with both a firm’s ACSI 
score and its ICFR effectiveness. These variables include firm complexity (as measured by the 
number of segments), return on assets, and firm size (Ivanov et al., 2013; Doyle et al., (2007b). 
Firms with more than one segment are more likely to invest in customer satisfaction because 
they will be able to realize the benefit of the investment across the various segments (Ivanov et 
al., 2013).  This added complexity is likely to create additional challenges in maintaining an 
effective ICFR system (Doyle et al., 2007a).  Firms with higher ROA are more efficient and have 
more resources available to invest in customers and internal control systems (Doyle et al., 2007a; 
Ivanov et al., 2013).  Larger firms are expected to have more resources available to invest in 
customers and internal control systems (Doyle et al., 2007a; Ivanov et al., 2013). I, therefore, 
include the number of segments (n_segs), return on assets (ROA), and the logarithm of total 




Regression with Fixed Effects 
I first estimated the average treatment effect of remediating an ICFR weakness using several 
fixed effects regressions: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑛𝑛_𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑛𝑛_𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5) 
The 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 terms capture firm and year fixed effects, respectively. While estimating the fixed 
effects regressions, I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. This ensures that the estimated 
standard errors are not biased due to a violation in the assumption that the error terms in the 
regression are independent across firm-years. 
Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Model 
After using fixed-effects regressions, I estimate the average treatment effect using a 
dynamic difference-in-difference model (de Chaisemartin & D’Haultfœuille, 2018).  As 
previously discussed, this model explicitly accounts for heterogeneity in effect size of the 
treatment across firms and time. In addition, it allows me to separately estimate the treatment 
effect in each year following the treatment. I use the twowayfeweights and did_multipleGT Stata 
packages to test for effect heterogeneity and to estimate the dynamic effects models (de 
Chaisemartin & D’Haultfœuille, 2018).   
Sample Selection 
I obtained firm-years with the ACSI measure from the ACSI website. To facilitate joining 




each firm’s Central Index Key (CIK) by searching for the company’s name in either the 
Compustat or Audit Analytics database. When a potential match was identified, I conducted a 
web query using the company’s name and CIK to verify that the match was accurate.  
After populating the table with each firm’s CIK, I calculated the average ACSI score for 
firms that have multiple segments included in the ACSI database—ensuring that I had only one 
ACSI measure for each firm-year.  
Next, I used the Compustat segments file to count the number of segments for each firm. 
I then combined this information with each firm’s financial statement information that appears in 
the Compustat database before joining the resulting table with the ACSI table.   
Finally, I used a join to include in the final dataset the necessary information about ICFR 
weaknesses and remediation from the Audit Analytics database. For each firm-year, I combined 
both management and the auditor’s opinion concerning the presence of an ICFR weakness. Only 
one of the two parties was required to believe that an ICFR weakness was present in order for the 
firm-year to be designated as having a disclosed ICFR weakness. Using this information, I 
constructed the Trt_Rem measure that captures the timing of the treatment of remediating an 
ICFR weakness. 
Table 2 presents the derivation of my sample. The sample started with 5,980 firm-years 
that had an ACSI score. After eliminating firm-years with missing data from either the Compstat 
of Audit Analytics, the sample contained 1,669 firm-years for which all the necessary 
information was available. 






Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3 presents the frequency distribution of firms by industry.  Trade, including both 
wholesale and retail, is the largest industry represented by 66 firms, followed closely by 
transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary with 63 firms.  Table 4 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the variables in the sample used to estimate the various models.  Firms 
in the sample had an average ACSI score of 75.83 with a standard deviation of 6.22; scores 
ranged from 54 to 88.  Table 5 presents the pairwise correlations for all regression variables used 
in the analyses; Pearson correlations are presented below the diagonal, and Spearman 
correlations are presented above the diagonal.   
[Insert Table 3] 
[Insert Table 4] 
[Insert Table 5] 
Regression Results 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis for Models 1 - 5 with firm and year 
fixed effects as well as clustered standard errors.  In all models, the coefficients between internal 
control effectiveness and customer satisfaction are negative and are not statistically significant.  
In Model (1), the regression coefficient that summarizes the relationship between customer 
satisfaction and internal control effectiveness is negative (B = -0.35, t = -0.62, p>0.05); overall 
the model is statistically significant (F(235, 1,433) = 34.79, p < 0.01), with an adjusted R2 of 
0.83.  In Model (2), the regression coefficient that summarizes the relationship between customer 
satisfaction and internal control effectiveness is negative (B = -0.31, t = -0.56, p > 0.05); overall 




0.83.  In Model (3), the regression coefficient that summarizes the relationship between customer 
satisfaction and internal control effectiveness is negative (B = -0.35, t = -0.64, p > 0.05); overall 
the model is statistically significant (F(238, 1,430) = 34.75, p < 0.01), with an adjusted R2 of 
0.83. In Model (4), the regression coefficient that summarizes the relationship between customer 
satisfaction and internal control effectiveness is negative (B = -0.66, t = -0.60, p > 0.05); overall 
the model is statistically significant (F(240, 1428) = 34.79, p < 0.01), with an adjusted R2 of 
0.83.  In Model (5), the regression coefficient that summarizes the relationship between customer 
satisfaction and internal control effectiveness is negative (B = -0.51, t = -0.94, p > 0.05); overall 
the model is statistically significant (F(239, 1429) = 34.70, p < 0.01), with an adjusted R2 of 
0.83.  These findings do not support H1, which predicted that the treatment effect of remediating 
an ICFR weakness on customer satisfaction would be positive. 
[Insert Table 6] 
While informative, the results of my fixed effects regression to estimate the treatment 
effect of remediating an ICFR weakness may be inappropriate in the presence of significant 
heterogeneity in the size of the treatment effect for various firms. To investigate this concern, I 
used the twowayfeweights Stata package created by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2018) 
to see how much heterogeneity would be necessary to lead to concerns that the sign on the fixed 
effects regression reported in Table 7 is incorrect.   
[Insert Table 7] 
The analysis revealed that a fairly small degree of treatment heterogeneity could result in 
a fixed-effects coefficient with the opposite sign of the true average treatment effect. About 16% 
of the estimated treatment effects received a negative weight. More importantly, the 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 




deviation greater than 0.29 can give a fixed-effects coefficient with the incorrect sign. It is not 
unreasonable to believe that the standard deviation of the treatment effects will exceed this 
amount as each control deficiency is of a unique nature and severity and, therefore, the 
procedures installed to remediate the problem could vary considerably in their impact on 
customer satisfaction. Heterogeneity in treatment effect size is especially concerning when the 
effect size is correlated with the timing of remediation (de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille, 
2018). In my sample, this type of correlation is plausible; more severe control deficiencies were 
likely more quickly discovered post-SOX, or possibly took longer to discover. This could mean 
that treatment effects are larger or smaller in earlier periods than later periods, which would bias 
the fixed-effects coefficient. 
In addition to verifying the accuracy of the results from the fixed-effects regression, I am 
also interested in checking for time-series variation in the treatment effect that may be of interest 
in its own right. For example, it might be the case that remedying a control deficiency leads to an 
immediate increase (or decrease) in customer satisfaction, but this effect changes over time. For 
example, it is plausible that customers are initially unsatisfied with a change in the company's 
policies and procedures due to increased bureaucracy, but, over time, they become accustomed to 
the changes, and the effect deteriorates or even reverses. 
To verify robustness and investigate the presence of dynamic effects, I use the 
did_multipleGT Stata package created by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2018). This 
package allows me to estimate the average treatment effect of remediating a control deficiency 
on customer satisfaction for each year following the discovery of the control deficiency. In 
addition to explicitly modeling and accounting for heterogeneity in the effect size of remediating 




remediation. The fixed effects regression assumed that the remediation process at least started 
during the year in which the control deficiency was discovered. To the extent that remediation 
does not begin immediately after the discovery of a weakness, the fixed effects design might 
result in attenuated estimates of the average treatment effect.   
I started my analysis of dynamic treatment effects by first verifying the common trends 
assumption that is necessary to estimate treatment effects using a difference-in-differences 
approach.  In the context of my study, the common trends assumption would be violated if firms 
that remediate a control weakness had trends in their customer satisfaction ratings that differed 
from firms that do not remediate a control weakness.  De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille  
(2018) provide a test for the common trends assumption that involves estimating placebo effects 
during the period prior to treatment.  If the common trends assumption is correct, there should be 
no identifiable differences-in-differences for the periods prior to treatment.  Table 8 presents the 
results of the placebo test for the five periods prior to treatment.  The analysis suggests no 
detectable difference in trends across groups. First, most point estimates are reasonably close to 
zero, with the possible exception of the year just prior to treatment. Second, none of the point 
estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero. Third, the placebo effects switch sign from 
one period to the next, which is inconsistent with any linear or monotonic trends (although a 
more complex trend is still possible). 
Given the results of the placebo test, I now move to estimating dynamic treatment effects 
that allow for heterogeneity in effect size across time. I estimate the treatment effects for the year 
of remediation and for five years thereafter.  
Table 8 shows the results of my difference-in-differences model.  Column 1 is the year of 




the six years after the remediation of an ICFR weakness.  The results indicate a negative 
treatment effect for most years, although none of the effects are statistically significant at the 
traditional level (all p-values>0.10).  The results are presented graphically in Figure 4, which 
makes clear the uncertainty in the estimated treatment effect and the fact that the results are not 
significant at the traditional level (i.e., the confidence intervals include zero).  These results do 
not support my hypothesis that effective ICFR increases customer satisfaction.   
[Insert Table 8] 
[Insert Figure 4] 
DISCUSSION 
 My hypothesis is not supported by the results of this study.  The results are somewhat 
surprising given prior research (Bauer et al., 2018; Feng et al., 2015; Gallemore & Labro, 2015); 
however, it should be noted that prior studies examined business-to-business relationships rather 
than the business-to-consumer relationships explored in this study.  The marketing literature has 
established that industrial customers and consumers are different (Industrial Marketing Review 
Board, 1954).  The Industrial Marketing Review Board (1954) suggests that industrial 
customers’ purchases are based on formulated policy, while consumer purchases are less 
structured.  Su et al., (2014) states, “[i]ndustrial customers, compared to their consumer 
counterparts, are more dependent on firms’ implicit claims,”  suggesting that it is possible 
disclosure of ICFR weaknesses may have a more significant impact on companies with industrial 
customers rather than companies dedicated to the consumer market.   Consistent with this 
hypothesis, they found that the sales growth of consumer-oriented companies decreased less 




companies (Su et al., 2014).  Companies included in my study were primarily consumer-oriented 
companies.   
The present study is the first to attempt to establish a relationship between effective 
internal controls over financial reporting and consumer customer satisfaction.  While it is not 
possible to draw conclusions from statistically insignificant results, the following considerations 
may contribute to the current study’s failure to support its hypothesis:   
1. As some managers have suggested, there are no substantial operating benefits to having 
effective ICFR (Alexander et al., 2013).   
2. The bureaucracy of an effective internal control system may impair the ability of the 
company to meet customers' expectations.  This is especially likely for controls that 
directly impact the customer, such as approvals and authorizations.  Often such controls 
add barriers to the business transaction, and the customer may see little benefit. This is 
unlikely to be true of control activities that occur “behind the scenes” such as 
reconciliations and reviews.   
3. Disclosed weaknesses in the effectiveness of a company’s internal control system may 
not be an adequate proxy for the quality of a company’s internal control system.  For 
example, Rice and Weber (2012) found that only 32.4% of firms reported a material 
weakness in internal control during the period of a material misstatement of the financial 
statements.  The material weakness was only disclosed once the financial statements were 
restated.  It is possible that firms with ineffective internal controls do not disclose 




4. It is possible that the ineffective internal controls are the result of ineffective management 
in a broader sense.  It is plausible that ineffective management may make decisions that 
benefit the customer at the expense of financial reporting quality.  
5. As is the case with any observational study, an unidentified variable may be effecting 
both internal controls and customer satisfaction.   
Future research can investigate these possibilities with either archival or experimental methods.  
This study has a number of limitations, including its observational nature, its small 
sample size, and the fact that most of the instances of ineffective controls occurred early in the 
implementation of SOX. The small sample size implies that the statistical tests used are of low 
power. This increases the chances of a Type II error: it might be that my tests failed to reject the 
null hypothesis because of a small sample (and, therefore, low power) and not because there is 
no treatment effect of remediating ICFR weaknesses. Identifying alternative measures of 
customer satisfaction that are available for more firms would provide a more robust test of the 
treatment effect of remediating ICFR weaknesses on customer satisfaction.   
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to extend emerging research that suggests a spillover effect 
from ICFR to operations by investigating the benefit of effective ICFR to customer satisfaction.  
This study did not provide evidence to support a spillover of ICFR to customer satisfaction.  On 
the contrary, the point estimates of the treatment effect of remediating an ICFR weakness were 
consistently negative, although they did not reach statistical significance at traditional levels.  
The lack of statistical significance may be due to a small sample size; however, the direction of 
the estimates indicates that it is unlikely that remediating control weaknesses will increase 




for only a small number of firms.  Other methods of measuring customer satisfaction might yield 
different results.   
While caution is necessary when interpreting statistically insignificant point estimates, 
my results may have implications for companies as they make choices regarding the design and 
implementation of internal controls over financial reporting.  It may be to companies’ advantage 
to select and implement control activities that are less visible to customers but are effective at 
mitigating the identified risk.  The study has implications for auditors as well.  Auditors, 
especially those serving the internal audit function, should be mindful of the relationship 
between internal controls and customer satisfaction. Some internal controls might come at the 
cost of customer satisfaction. Auditors should keep this potential tradeoff in mind when 








Comparison of Internal Control Requirements of FCPA, FDICIA, and SOX 
 FCPA  FDICIA  SOX 
Applies to: Public companies. 
 Applicable to 
institutions 
with assets 





over $75 million. 
Management Responsibility Yes  Yes  Yes 
Report on the effectiveness 
of ICFR No 
 Yes  Yes 
Auditor attestation of 
management report No 
 Yes  Yes 
Auditor attestation of the 
effectiveness of ICFR No 






 # of Observations 
Firm-years with ACSI scores from 1992 to 2018 5,980 
Missing Compustat data -2,592 
Firm-years with ACSI scores and Compustat data 3,388 
Missing Audit Analytics data  -1,719 







Frequency Distribution of Firms by Industry 
  N  % 
Mining and Construction  1  0.00 
Manufacturing  38  17.27 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, 
and Sanitary  Service 
 63  28.64 
Trade  66  30.00 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate  36  16.36 
Services  15  6.82 
Public Administration  1  0.00 






Descriptive Statistics—All Observations 
 n Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Dependent Variable         
  ACSIt 1,669 75.83 6.22 54 72.00 77.00 80.00 88.00 
Independent Variables         
  Trt_Remt 1,669 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  RDt 1,669 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 
  Advertt 1,669 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.43 
  Complexityt 1,669 0.92 0.62 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.39 2.30 
  Sizet 1,669 10.17 1.71 5.15 9.18 10.07 11.06 14.76 









Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. ACSIi,t 1.00 0.11** 0.32** 0.28** -0.07** -0.14** 0.23** 
2. Trt_Remi,t 0.09 ** 1.00** 0.05* 0.20** -0.09** -0.19** -0.06* 
3. RDi,t 0.19** 0.01 1.00 0.36** 0.00 0.03 0.22** 
4. Adverti,t 0.23** 0.12** 0.15** 1.00 -0.26** -0.37** 0.32** 
5. Complexityi,t 0.02 -0.10** -0.08** -0.15** 1.00 0.32** -0.10** 
6. Sizei,t -0.09** -0.18** 0.01 -0.49** 0.32** 1.00 -0.30** 
7. ROAi,t 0.20** -0.01 0.09** 0.22** -0.06** -0.18** 1.00 
 
* Coefficients with a one-tailed p-value of < 0.05. 
** Coefficients with a one-tailed p-value of < 0.01. 
Pearson pairwise correlations presented along the bottom diagonal.  















  Table 6 
Model 1 – Regression Results with Firm Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, and Clustered 
Standard Errors 
Dependent variable – ACSIi,t 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Independent 
Variables 









































1,433 1,431 1,430 1,429 1,428 
R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 
***, **, * Denote significant two-tailed p-values at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and  p < 0.10, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 













Placebo Test for the Five Periods Prior to Treatment 
 DV=ACSI 
IV=Trt_Rem t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 











Degrees of Freedom 352 425 535 655 792 910 
***, **, * Denote significant p-values at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and  p < 0.10 levels (one-tailed), respectively. 











Average Treatment Effects Estimates From Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Model 
 DV=ACSI 
IV=Trt_Rem t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 










































Control for RD, Advert, 















Control for RD, Advert, 















N 910 762 633 521 431 285 272 
***, **, * Denote significant p-values at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and  p < 0.10 levels (one-tailed), respectively. 

























Figure 3 – ACSI Model (Antecedents Excluded) 
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 ACSI Customer satisfaction measured by the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI). 
Trt_Rem 
An indicator variable set to 1 if a firm began remediating an ICFR 
weakness in year t, and otherwise 0.  ICFR weaknesses were obtain from 
audit analytics database. 
RD Firm research and development expense scaled by total assets. 
Advert Advertising expense; ratio of advertising expenses to revenues; advertising expense in year t divided by revenue in year t.  
n_segs The logarithm of the number of operating segments for a firm-year reported in the Compustat segments file. 
Size Natural log of the total assets of the firm. 
ROA Return on assets, net income/net loss divided by total assets.   
  
  
 
